๐Ÿ”ฅ๐Ÿ”ฅ WELCOME 2 ASMON DOT EXE ๐Ÿ”ฅ๐Ÿ”ฅ  โ€ข  TRUSTLESS TRAINING (trust me bro)  โ€ข  GPU GO BRRRR  โ€ข  HONEST FALSE POSITIVE RATE: 0.000 (no cap)  โ€ข  10 WORKERS ๐Ÿ” 40 ROUNDS ๐ŸŒ€  โ€ข  BYZANTINE GPUS BEWARE ๐Ÿ’€  โ€ข  slash the liars โœ‚๏ธ pay the honest ๐Ÿ’ฐ  โ€ข  ๐Ÿ”ฅ๐Ÿ”ฅ vibes: IMMACULATE ๐Ÿ”ฅ๐Ÿ”ฅ  โ€ข 
asmon chicken logo
ASMON
v0.4.0 ยท totally works
trust me bro ๐Ÿค™
๐Ÿ”
โ–“ TRUSTING NODES... PLS WAIT โ–“
๐Ÿค– ๐Ÿ’พ ๐Ÿ”ฅ ๐Ÿ’€ โœจ
100% REAL FOOTAGE ๐Ÿ“น
โ–“ SIMULATION STATE: ACTIVE โ–“
โ–“ RENDER: MAX GOOFY โ–“
๐Ÿ” PROTOCOL ID: ASMON // trust nobody edition ๐Ÿ”

TRUST NOBODY.
TRAIN EVERYBODY.

~ trusted training from untrusted compute (fr fr) ~

ok so basically ๐Ÿ‘‰ it's a fault-tolerant, low-communication protocol that trains a frontier-scale model across churning, heterogeneous, Byzantine consumer GPUs โ€” WITHOUT assuming a single node is trustworthy. the GPUs can drop out, run cursed hardware, and straight up LIE ๐Ÿ’€ and it still works. sheeeesh.

WORKERS
10
OUTER ROUNDS
40
SYNC EVERY
20
HONEST FPR
0.000
01 ยท the structural constraint ๐Ÿ˜ค

COMPUTE IS LOCKED BEHIND LIKE 3 DATACENTERS and that's not a cost problem bestie, it's a gatekeeping problem ๐Ÿšช๐Ÿ”’

the math of low-communication training?? already solved. DiLoCo- and DeMo-class methods thin gradient sync by 100ร—โ€“1000ร—. we did NOT reinvent that (we're not weird). asmon solves the ONE thing nobody solved: making that algorithm survive a swarm that drops out, runs random hardware, and lies to your face. the moat isn't cheap GPUs โ€” it's a heterogeneity-aware, Byzantine-robust aggregation + verification layer. based.

๐Ÿ“Œ THIS AIN'T AN INFERENCE DePIN.

io.net & Nosana-type networks sell inference hours; their moat = cheap GPUs.

asmon is on the TRAINING side. they sell cheaper compute. we produce trusted training from untrusted compute. different game entirely ๐ŸŽฎ
02 ยท the synchronization boundary ๐Ÿงท

EVERY MODULE EITHER FEEDS THE BOUNDARY, DEFENDS IT, OR MEASURES IT. no freeloaders. ๐Ÿšง

each worker trains a local replica for H inner steps, then yeets a pseudo-gradient ฮ” = ฮธ_global โˆ’ ฮธ_local. the outer optimizer treats the aggregate as a gradient under Nesterov momentum (the DiLoCo outer loop). sabotage lives STRICTLY between "workers producing" and "aggregator combining." workers always compute honestly โ€” the boundary is where the chaos sneaks in. ๐Ÿ•ณ๏ธ

  • OUTER OPTIMIZERNesterov ยท lr 0.7 ยท ฮฒ 0.9
  • PSEUDO-GRADIENTฮ” = ฮธ_global โˆ’ ฮธ_local
  • SYNC INTERVALevery 20 inner steps
  • SUBSTRATEmanual MLP ยท Adam ยท flat ฮธ
  • REPLAYABILITY(wid, round) โ†’ pure fn
  • DETERMINISM1 master seed โ†’ all draws
03 ยท security by intersection ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ

SECURITY = 3 LAYERS STACKED ON TOP OF EACH OTHER each one covering the others' L ๐Ÿฅž

L1

ROBUST AGGREGATION

aggregator.py

bounds the damage radius of any single attack. Mean, coordinate-wise median, Multi-Krum, and centered clipping w/ far-outlier excision. crude attacks that break naive averaging get rejected FOR FREE. ๐Ÿ†“

Damage radiusBOUNDED โœ…
L2

VERIFICATION

verifier.py

raises the PRICE of lying. exact recompute audits over replayable claims โ†’ binary fraud proofs, judged by a randomly sampled committee of bonded verifiers under majority vote. being statistically invisible does NOT save you. ๐Ÿ‘๏ธ

Fraud proofBINARY โœ…
L3

STAKING

economy.py

makes the adversary fraction a real, PRICED quantity. every worker posts a bond; conviction slashes it in full & ejects them; seized bonds split between committee + treasury. Sybil attacks now cost real money ๐Ÿ’ธโœ‚๏ธ

Sybil attackPRICED โœ…

โ†ณ ๐Ÿ”— the blockchain sits ONLY at the settlement edge โ€” a bonded-verifier network that rewards honest compute and slashes fake contributions. that's it. we're not doing a coin bro chill.

04 ยท the failure this thing measures ๐Ÿ“‰

A ROBUST AGGREGATOR THAT QUIETLY YEETS THE MOST HETEROGENEOUS HONEST WORKERS just re-invents the centralization we're trying to KILL ๐Ÿ’€

0.30 โžก๏ธ 0.000FPR

under Multi-Krum on non-IID shards with ZERO real attackers, the same honest workers (w3, w6, w9) get permanently exiled at 100% rejection ๐Ÿ’€ โ€” a 0.092 mean-accuracy tax paid to literally nobody (scenario C, huge L). two-regime aggregation (banish the impossible, clip the plausible) fixes it: honest FPR drops to 0.000 and the accuracy gap shrinks to โˆ’0.005 (scenario F, we're so back ๐Ÿ”™). THIS is why FPR โ€” not attack success โ€” is the number the protocol optimizes.

05 ยท scenarios, measured ๐Ÿงช

WE RAN THE SIMS. HERE'S THE RECEIPTS. ๐Ÿงพ

10 workers ยท 40 outer rounds ยท sync every 20 inner steps ยท 8-class Gaussian blobs in 20 dimensions ๐Ÿซง

IDSetupAttackFinal accKey metric
A2IID ยท Multi-Krumnone0.882honest FPR 0.30 ยท damage none
B1IID ยท meansign-flip 3/100.080 ๐Ÿ’€attack success 0.91 (RIP)
B3IID ยท Multi-KrumALIE 3/100.810malicious selected 1.00
Cnon-IID ยท Multi-Krumnone0.787honest FPR 0.30 ยท gap 0.092
Fnon-IID ยท clip+excisionnone0.868honest FPR 0.000 ๐ŸŽ‰
Gnon-IID ยท clip+excisionsign-flip 3/100.790vs mean 0.125 ยท Krum 0.828
Hnon-IID ยท full stackALIE 3/100.805ejected by r2 ยท honest PnL +40
Ichurn + Dirichlet ยท full stackALIE 3/100.785FPR 0.000 ยท ejected by r5

โ†ณ crude attacks break naive aggregation (B1, big oof). robust aggregation is BLIND to coordinated stealth (B3). verification closes the hole aggregation leaves open (H). teamwork makes the dream work ๐Ÿค

06 ยท the theorem, measured โš–๏ธ

MORE VOTERS = MORE CORRECT. it's literally in the name. ๐Ÿ—ณ๏ธ

Committee error vs committee size ๐Ÿ“ˆq = 0.30
k = 5 ยท 0.158 k = 25 ยท 0.007 k = 1 k = 25 error

committee verdicts are majority votes over verifiers sampled from a pool with malicious fraction q. error decays EXPONENTIALLY in committee size while q < ยฝ, and stalls as q creeps toward ยฝ. an independent plurality makes collusion infeasible. collusion is the only attack that survives scale. that's the whole Condorcet Jury Theorem, no notes. ๐Ÿง 

07 ยท the price of lying ๐Ÿ’ธ

DETERRENCE IS A DIAL, not a hope & a prayer ๐ŸŽ›๏ธ

every audit is a paid recompute โ€” a fee of one round's reward. attacker income before slashing tracks (1 โˆ’ p)/p and detection latency tracks 1/p. at audit rate 0.25 a colluder banks like THREE reward units before forfeiting a 100-unit bond. the mean obeys theory; the geometric tail sets the bond. math is mathing. ๐Ÿงฎ

Audit rate pEjected in roundsBreak-even bondTheoryFee overheadUncaught / 40r
0.1014.613.79.012%1 of 12 ๐Ÿ˜ฌ
0.156.25.25.717%0 of 12 โœ…
0.254.13.13.031%0 of 12 โœ…
0.402.51.51.548%0 of 12 โœ…
0.601.70.70.767%0 of 12 โœ…
SELF-FUNDING UNDER ATTACK ๐Ÿค‘
+241

Scenario H: 64 audits cost 64 in fees while seizures returned 305. security pays for ITSELF while it's being attacked. free real estate. ๐Ÿ 

INSURANCE PREMIUM IN PEACE ๐Ÿ•Š๏ธ
31%

with zero attackers, audits are pure overhead: p ร— fee per worker-round, or 31% of payroll at p = 0.25. picking the audit rate is basically an insurance-pricing problem. ๐Ÿ“‹

08 ยท run the sim yourself ๐Ÿ–ฅ๏ธ ยท NumPy only, no cap

v0 IS A SELF-CONTAINED SIM OF THE PROTOCOL'S SINGLE AXIS. clone it. run it. gaslight your GPU. ๐Ÿ˜ˆ

the three-layer security story maps onto three files: aggregator.py, verifier.py, economy.py. same config, same history, bit for bit. deterministic af. ๐ŸŽฏ

// shell.exe ๐Ÿš
# set up the environment ๐Ÿ› ๏ธ
uv venv .venv && uv pip install -e ".[dev]"

# run the test suite ๐Ÿงช
.venv/bin/pytest

# scenario suite Aโ€“I + jury curve ๐Ÿ“Š
.venv/bin/python -m condorcet.train

# economics sweep ยท break-even bond ๐Ÿ’ฐ
.venv/bin/python -m condorcet.sweep
R1

ADAPTIVE THRESHOLDS

estimated adversary fractions replace static f, w/ median-of-means hardening for small populations.

R2

VERIFIER STAKING

bonded verifiers w/ their own slash conditions + collusion-resistant committee rotation.

R3

SUBSTRATE SCALE-UP

toy MLP โ†’ transformer blocks, quantized delta compression, gradient sparsification.

R4

CHURN REALISM

session-length distros from real consumer fleets, stragglers, partial credit for interrupted rounds.